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ABSTRACT
Wecalculate a time series of the value of federal mineral rights in oil and
natural gas by using various estimates of proven and unproven reserves and time
series on federal government royalties and bonus payments. We also present estimates
of the components of the revaluation of this series through time.
The results are striking. Federal mineral rights are the single largest item
in a complete balance sheet of the federal government, dominating the total value of
tangible capital or financial assets. In 1981, for example, we estimate that the
value of federal oil and gas rights exceeded $800 billion, which was larger than
the privately held national debt. The paper also presents estimates of various conf i—
dence bounds on the value of oil and natural gas. The methodology can be extended to
other minerals, although we have not done so; our estimate is a lower bound on the
total value of all mineral rights.
The paper also expands and extends previous estimates of the value of federal
land. New data, and attention to the detailed decomposition of federal land holdings
by type, lead to substantially larger estimates of the value of federal land than
have been presented in previous research. Our estimate is that by 1981, the total
value of federal land was $175 billion.
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The federal government owns a substantial fraction of the mineral
rights and land in the United States.The value of these resources varies
substantially over time, both with acquisitions and sales of these assets and
with changes in the prices of the minerals and land involved. Whether one is
interested in measures of national wealth, land management policy as part of
efficient government operations, or (long—run) macroeconomic fiscal policy
issues, time series estimates of the value of federal mineral rights and land
are potentially valuable information.
At one extreme, consider a country or state which owns substantial
mineral rights when the price of those minerals skyrockets. The additional
revenues potentially available either for use in the public sector, or to
allow tax cuts to provide greater private income, may alter the course of the
economy. There are historical precedents. Saudi Arabia was able virtually to
abolish taxation due to revenues from the sale of mineral rights, and Alaska
actually used oil based revenues to provide cash grants on a per capita basis
to its citizens, thereby increasing their private wealth and consumption
opportunities.
The microeconomics of sensible resource allocation, within the public
sector and between the public and private sector, relies on careful cost——2—
benefit evaluations of the value of public services and the opportunity costs
of providing them. These in turn are onlypossiblewith accurate information
on actual and potential revenue sources, including the opportunity costs of
purchases and sales of assets, as well as traditional flows of income into and
out of the public sector. Therefore, the value of federal mineral rights and
land is potentially an important piece of information for a host of public
policy questions.
The purpose of this paper is to provide new time series estimates of
the value of federal mineral rights and land in the post—war period in the
United States. It brings together various data sources in as consistent away
as possible, uses reasonable economic theory to infer the value of mineral
rights, and compares the results with previous estimates. The results suggest
that the value of federal mineral rights and land is quite substantial, and
can fluctuate by tens of billions of dollars annually.These sorts of
changes, when aggregated over any substantial period of time, may suggest a
reappraisal of traditional land management policy as part of a comprehensive
overall fiscal policy.
In section 2 we consider the valuation of federal mineral rights, in
particular the revenue which the government is able to obtain from onshore and
offshore leases for the extraction of oil and natural gas.Section 2.1
reviews some recent studies of resource accounting, none of which focuses on
the government sector.
Section 2.2 presents an original methodology for valuing mineral
rights. We estimate, in section 2.3, the value of federal oil and gas mineral
rights to be $819 billion in 1981, a number higher than the privately—held—3—
federal debt in that year.1 Our estimates consider economically recoverable
undiscovered reserves2 and therefore would substantially exceed estimates
which used the methods of previous studies.
Section 3 is devoted to the valuation of federal land. We review the
work of Goldsmith, Milgram, and Eisner and Pieper on this subject in 3.1. In
3.2 we present new updated estimates of the value of federal land, taking into
account the changing composition of federal land. Our estimate for 1981 is
$175 billion, composed of $112 billion urban land and $63 billion rural land.
Section 1 provides a summary and agenda for research, and an appendix
provides the details of Milgram's methodology for estimating government land
value and our extension of her estimates._14_
2. THE VALUEOF FEDERAL MINERAL RIGHTS
2.1 Previous Studies of Resource Accounting
A number of recent studies of income accounting for exhaustible
resources, such as oil and natural gas, support the inclusion of estimates of
the underground reserves of these resources in measures of national income and
wealth.3 The current accounting practice is to exclude such estimates. The
National Income and Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
consider only production of mineral resources, ignoring the level of reserves.
The studies favor including the net value of proven reserves in estimates of
national wea1th. This value could change through discovery, depletion, and
changes in the price of the resource.
The perpetual inventory method provides a means of building on an
estimate of the value of proven minerals for a particular year. Determining
the annual changes in value is fairly straightforward; the major difficulty
arises in determining a base year estimate for the value of proven resources.
In an important study, Landefeld and Hines 119821 discuss three methods for
estimation:the present value method, the land price method, and the net
price method.
The present value method requires forecasting prices, operating costs,
production and interest rates over the life of the field after its
discovery.The present value of the stream of net revenues is determined.
Soladay [19801 extends this method by trying to take into account the upward
revisions in estimates of reserves that typically occur after the discovery;
the total quantity produced from a field is greater than the initial dis-
covery.Several ways of guessing future trends in net revenues have been—5—
used.Soladay extrapolates future net revenues based on a weighted average of
net revenues over the period 19148—19T4 and chooses a particular interest
rate.Landefeld and Hines report results for three arbitrary choices of
growth rate in net revenue and interest rates. The SEC5 proposed that com-
panies be required to assume no growth in net revenue and a 10% discount rate.
The net price method assumes that net revenues increase at the rate of
interest. According to economic theory, this is necessary for equilibrium if
the cost of exploration and extraction is the same for all of the exhaustible
resource. The advantage of this method is that it does not require any
assumptions regarding the time path of production, since any pattern has the
same present value.T
The third method discussed by Landefeld and Hines, the land price
method, assumes that the entire value of the proven reserves is paid to the
landowner in the form of bonus payments and royalties. They also assume that
royalties are a constant fraction of the net value of the resource, so that
annual data on bonuses can be used to estimate the value of the oil and gas
prospects leased that year. One problem with this method is that the value of
oil and gas prospects leased in a particular year bears no particular rela-
tionship, even in expected value terms, to new proven reserves in that year,
because of decision and drilling lags. This is therefore fundamentally dif-
ferent from either the present value or net price methods. A second diff i—
culty lies in Landefeld and Hines' estimates, since they use 12.5% as the
fraction of net price which is paid in the form of royalties. Since royalties
are at least 12.5% of the gross price of oil and gas, this significantly
understates the importance of royalties, and their estimate for the value of—6—
oiland gas prospects leased is too low. This is confirmed by noting that the
estimates using the land price are much smaller than their estimates using
other methods.
Each of these methods is inadequate for creating government wealth and
capital formation accounts. The most important problem is the neglect of the
value of economically recoverable undiscovered reserves, which, as argued
below, understates wealth and capital gains and overstates government
investment.
Earlier studies argued against including economically recoverable
undiscovered resources in either national or firm accounts on the grounds that
estimates were too uncertain. This problem is much less severe for the U.S.
as a whole than for individual firms, since the sample of prospects is far
larger and, therefore, the distribution is tighter (the coefficient of
variation is smaller). While the range of estimates of undiscovered resources
maybewide, there is no a priori reason for believing an estimate to be
biased.By contrast, assuming that undiscovered resources have no value is
surely biased and, therefore, estimates of wealth and income will be biased.—1—
2.2 Methodology for Valuing Mineral Rights
The base year value of federal mineral rights is the sum of three
components: future royalties on proven reserves, future royalties on
estimated undiscovered reserves and future bonuses on unleased land. This may
be written (choosing 1981 as the base year) as follows:
(1) V1981 =PVR+PVR+PVB
where
PVR =Presentvalue of future royalties on proven reserves,
both onshore and offshore
PVRu =Presentvalue of future royalties on undiscovered
reserves, again both onshore and offshore.
PVB =Presentvalue of bonuses on mineral leases.
To obtain the value for any future year, we take the value for the
previous year, add capital gains or losses and subtract bonus and royalty
payments received. Capital gains and losses are calculated by assuming that
the price in that year is the base from which future prices grow at the
interestrate. Since all three components of the base year value are propor-
tional to the current price, the capital gain is just the change in price
timesthe previous year's value. Using this method, the base year value can
be projected backwards as well.
When the government leases the mineral rights in a particular area, it
has reduced its wealth by transferring it to the private sector.In return,
the government receives some payment immediately in the form of a bonus, with
the rest of the payments deferred as royalties or rental payments. By the—8—
timereserves are proven, their only value to the government is the present
value of the royalties they represent.
Ignoring undiscovered reserves can cause several problems in the wealth
and income accounts of the government. For example, the sale of leases would
be treated as an increase in government receipts and wealth rather than an
asset sale and future royalty rights would not appear in the accounts until
drilling was successful.Alternative, but economically identical, forms of
payment would appear to change the wealth of the government. Further, capital
gains and losses associated with price changes would only be counted on proven
reserves.Government real capital formation would be overstated, since the
sale of assets in the form of possible reserves would be ignored.9
For all of these reasons, we believe accurate resource accounting for
the government sector requires estimating a value for the undiscovered
reserves on government land.This only needs to be done for a base year;
changes can enter using the perpetual inventory method.For the base year
calculation, we use Department of the Interior estimates for the expected
undiscovered reserves for onshore federal land and offshore.1° To value the
royalties on these undiscovered reserves, an assumption regarding future
prices needs to be made. We choose the strong and convenient assumption that
future prices are expected to increase at the rate of interest.This
assumption means that the time path of production is irrelevant; all
production patterns yield the same present value of royalties.Such time
independence is especially useful for undiscovered reserves since there is a
substantial and uncertain time until the resource will be extracted.The
assumption can be justified by noting that the Long—Term Pricing Committee of—9—
OPEC has recommended a 3% real annual increase in oil prices, which given its
low cost of production would be close to that suggested by economic theory.
The average annual rate of increase in real oil prices received by U.S.
producers was 3.5% over the period l950_1982.ll
This assumption implies that the value of future royalties on both
undiscovered and proven reserves on federal land is the royalty rate times the
quantity of reserves times the current price for the relevant resource. Thus,
(2) PVR = P.(rx +r0xR'0) p p p
where k indexes the mineral, f indexes offshore reserves, o indexes onshore
reserves, Ris the quantity of reserves and ris the relevant royalty
rate.12
Similarly,
(3) PYR = . (r1'x +r0x R'cO)
The present value of future bonus payments on unleased land also needs
to be included to obtain the base year estimate for the value of federal
mineral rights. To do this, we first find the present value of bonuses paid
to the federal government over the period l954_l979.l3 We divide this by the
present value of royalties paid over the period 1956—1981 plus the estimated
value of future royalties on proven reserves on federal land in 1981.The
difference in the periods covered is designed to account for discovery and
production lags.We assume that the present value of future bonuses on—10—
undiscovered resources will be the same fraction of estimated future royalties








PVB1954_1919 =Presentvalue of bonuses paid to the government on
leased land from 1954 to 1919, in 1981 prices.
PVR1956_1981 =Presentvalue of royalties paid to the government
from 1956 to 1981, in 1981 prices.
Since PVR PVR are calculated as in (2) and (3) above, we only need
toconvert the bonuses and royalties actually paid in the period to current
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B =Bonusespaid to the Government for year -r.
=GNPdeflator for 1981.







R=Royaltiesreceived by the Government in year r.
2.3.Estimates of the Value of Federal Oil and Gas Mineral Rights
Ourestimatesfor the value of federal oil and gas mineral rights in
1981 are presented in Table 1.Two striking facts are apparent. First, the
present value of bonuses from offshore mineral leases far exceeds the corres-
ponding figure for onshore leases.The reason for this is that offshore
bonuses were much greater than onshore bonuses in the period 195'—1919. For
example, since 1911, offshore bonuses have annually exceeded one billion
dollars whereas onshore bonuses did not reach twenty million dol1ars.1 This
difference is reflected in our estimate of the present value of bonuses
through equation (n).
Second,the present value of future royalties from economically
recoverable undiscovered reserves similarly dominates the corresponding figure
for proven reserves. The explanation for this is straightforward: estimates
of undiscovered resources are much larger than currently proven reserves.—12—
Table 1: Calculation of the Value of Federal Mineral
Rights for Oil and Natural Gas (v1951)
(Billions of 1981 Dollars)
Component Total OnshoreOffshore










V1981c 819.3 iL6.1 612.8
a This figure is calculated assuming that the future ratio of onshoreand
offshore bonuses will remain the same as in the historical period.
bThis figure is derived assuming that the ratio of offshore undiscovered gas
reserves in Alaska is the same as in the 18 states.
C Thepresent value of bonuses for the period l95I1979 for offshore and
onshore were $50.9 and $0.2 billion respectively. The corresponding figures
for the value of royalties for the period 1956—1981 were $20.81 and $8.10
billion respectively.
The detailed time series of the total value of federal oil and gas
mineral rights from 1951 to 1982, presented in Table 2, are extremely inter-
esting.The aggregate series began a very rapid growth in 1911k, and jumped
again in 1919—80.The current value of over $800 billion is the single
largest asset in the complete balance sheet of the federal government. It is
substantially larger than the value of federal land. In fact, it is approx—
imately the combined value of all federal tangible assets or all federal
financial assets.15Prior to 1914, the total series was q.uite stable in
nominal dollars, and therefore it exhibited a slight downward decline in real
terms. While the dollar value has increased sharply recently, even prior to
the increases in ener&y prices the values for oil and gas were substantial.—13—
Table 2
Value of Federal Oil and Natural Gas Rights
and Changes in Value, 195141982
(Billions of Current Dollars)
Year Value Change in Value
a Total Oil Gas
19514 80.6 62.3 18.3
1955 80.8 62.0 18.8 0.2
1956 81.9 62.14 19.5 1.1
1951 89.14 69.0 20.14 7•5
1958 88.7 67.2 21.5 —1.7
1959 87.8 61i.6 23.2 —0.9
1960 90.0 63.9 25.1 2.2
1961 91.1 614.0 27.1 1.1
1962 91.3 63.7 27.6 0.2
1963 91.5 63.14 28.1 0.2
19614 90.14 63.0 27.14 —1.1
1965 90.1 62.14 27.7 —0.3
1966 90.2 62.5 27.7 0.1
1967 90.9 62.8 28.1 0.1
1968 90.14 62.1 28.3 —0.5
1969 93.6 614.9 28.7' 3.2
1910 914.9 65.9 28.7 3.2
1911 100.6 69.8 30.8 5.7
1972 101.5 67.9 30.6 0.9
1973 109.9 75.14 314.5 8.14
19714 176.0 129.2 146.8 66,1
1975 210.8 1142.9 67.9 314.8
1976 238.0 150.5 87.5 27.2
1977 273.9 155.8 118.1 35.9
1978 295.7 161.7 134.0 21.8
1979 389.5 222.8 166.7 93.8
1980 598.3 376.14 221.9 208.8
1981 819.3 5147.1 272.2 221.0
1982 817.2 1486.8 330.14 —2.1
a We have assumed that the present value of gas and oil bonuses are
proportional to the present value of gas and oil royalties on
undiscovered reserves, i.e.
PVBO PVR°For example, in 1911 the value was $100 billion (in 1971 dollars) which
was much more than the value of federal land.It also was twice as
large as the value of federal government gold holdings.
The relative value of oil and gas in the total has changed
somewhat over the period. While oil is still the largest component, the
share of oil has fallen from over three—fourths in the late 1950s, to
two—thirds or less in the last few years. While oil typically receives
more attention than natural gas, these figures reveal the importance of
natural gas.
Also included in Table 2 is the change in value from year to
year.These changes tended to be small until the total value became
large subsequent to the substantial increases in energy prices in 1973—
4•Thechange in the value of these mineral rights in many years in the
l9TOs and early 1980s exceeded the nominal federal government budget
deficit. 16
Table 3 breaks the change in the value of federal oil and natural gas
mineral rights through time into three components: revaluation, bonuses, and
royalties. While bonuses and royalties became large in the early l970s, they
are still relatively minor compared with the enormous revaluations of this
period. The bulk of the change in the value in most years is the revaluation
of the rights. The revaluations not only reflect the energy price shocks, but
also, once the total value of oil and gas become large, even small price
changes can lead to large revaluations. In recent years, these revaluations
are substantial relative to the capital gains on assets held by the household
sector of the United States.11—15—
Table 3
Components of the Change in Value of Federal
Oil and Gas Rights, 19511._1982
(Billions of Current Dollars)
Year Change in Value Components:
Revaluations Bonuses Royalties
1951.1. ___ ——— 0.1 0.0
1955 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
1956 1.1. 1.2 0.0 0.1
1957 7.5 7.6 0.0 0.1
1958 —1.7 —1.6 0.0 0.1
1959 —0.9 —0.7 0.1 0.1
1960 2.2 2.6 0.3 0.1
1961 1.1 1.2 0.0 0.1
1962 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.1
1963 0.2 0. 0.0 0.2
1961.1. —1.1 —0.8 0.1 0.2
1965 —0.3 —0.1 0.0 0.2
1966 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2
1967 0.7 1.11. 0.5 0.2
1968 —0.5 1.1 1.3 0.3
1969 3.2 3.6 0.1 0.3
1970 1.3 2.6 0.9 0.11.
1971 5.7 6.2 0.1 0.11.
1972 0.9 3.7 2.3 0.5
1973 8.11. 12.0 3.1 0.5
1971e 66.1 71.8 5.0 0.7
1975 311..8 36.7 1.1 0.8
1976 27.2 30.3 2.2 0.9
1977 35.9 38.7 1.6 1.2
1978 21.8 25.0 1.8 1.1k
1979 93.8 100.8 5.1 1.9
1980 208.8 215.8 4.2 2.8
1981 221.0 231.9 6. 1t.2
1982 —2.1 6.8 n.J.—16—
The figures in Tables 2 and 3 reveal how important proper valuation,
consideration, and evaluation of the value of federal government mineral
rights can be to accurate measures of national wealth, to measures of changes
in that wealth, and to sensible government budget reporting and policy. The
government policies most directly affected are those concerning mineral rights
leasing. Other government policies should also in principle reflect accurate
valuation of the opportunity cost of resources in the public sector.
The total value of these mineral rights, $19 billion, is enormous. To
place this in perspective, in 1981, this value exceeded the value of the
privately held national debt ($1914 billion).Obviously, the value of other
minerals would add to this total.Ignoring resources in national income and
wealth accounts, and government budgeting, can be quite misleading.
The estimates of undiscovered economically recoverable resources of
conventional oil and gas on federal land in 1981 were made by the U.S. Depart-
ment of the interior.18 Estimating proven reserves in a field where hydro-
carbons have been discovered is difficult and results in frequent revisions;
the task of estimating undiscovered recoverable resources is much more
complex, as the number of dry holes attests. Using a point estimate, however
well—founded in expert geological opinion, perhaps suggests more certainty
than actually exists. We have therefore calculated the value of federal oil
and gas mineral rights for 1981 using the high (5%) and low (95%) bounds
calculated by the USGS.19 The high estimate is $11314.9 billion, while the low
estimate is $582.1 billion. While the range of these estimates is clearly
large, even the low estimate shows that the value of federal oil and gas
mineral rights is substantial. Independent studies by other groups have come—17—
up with different ranges for the quantities of undiscovered recoverable oil
and gas in the U.S., but, at least since 1975, there has been a growing
consensus, with overlapping ranges and point estimates for both oil and gas
approximately within the range of the USGS [19811 estimates.2°
Twoadditionalpoints should be made about undiscovered resources.
First, they do not stV undiscovered forever.Annual additions to proven
offshore reserves were about 14% of the total stock of proven reserves over
the period 1977—1981 for both oil and gas. Second, estimates of undis-
covered recoverable resoirces depend upon prices and technology.Techno-
logical advances or real price increases typically would lead to upward
revisions in the estimates of undiscovered recoverable resources.—18—
3. THE VALUE OF FEDERAL LAND
3.1 Previous Studies of the Value of Federal Land
A time series for the value of federal land in the post—war period
(i915_i98l) is provided by the estimates of Goldsmith (1962), and the follow—
up studies by Milgram (1973) and Eisner and Pieper (l981).
Goldsmith bases his post—war time series on an estimate of the value of
government land on December 31, 191t6 in the study by Reeve et al (1950). The
land value estimate of the Reeve study has two main components: military and
non—military government land. These estimates are as follows:
Land, non—military: $)4.93 billion
Land, military:
a)market value $1.07 billion
b)replacement value $2.13 billion
The estimate for non—military land is based upon its original acqui-
sition cost, with (casually justified) adjustments to reflect l916 market
values.Separate adjustments were made for each of five categories of land.
For most categories, Reeve does not cite any source as the basis for the
adjustment factors employed.
For military land, Goldsmith chooses Reeve's replacement value figure,
which is an estimate of the cost to the military to replace its holdings with
comparable land. For non—military government land, Goldsmith's extension of
Reeve's estimates from l946 through 1958 is based upon two price indexes:—19—
FOREST LAND—Reeve'svalue for forest land in 1916 nn.iltiplied by
"index of stumpage prices in national forests."
OTHER CIVILIAN LAND—Valuefor l96 (Reeves's total minus forest land)
multiplied by "index of grazing land prices in western states."
Goldsmith describes his extension for military land as a "rough estimate."
Grace Milgram estimates the value of government land over the period
1952—1968.Her series is based upon Goldsmith's 1956 estimate. Values for
1952—1955 and 1967—1968 are extrapolated from her derived series.
Incrementsto the stock of government land are derived from the change
inthe General Services Administration's (GSA's) annual estimates of the value
of government land, from the change in acreage of government urban land and
rural land, and from price series developed by Milgram for rural, non—
met ropolitan and urban land.
Milgram derives an independent estimate of the value ofrural govern-
ment landin 1956, using rural government acreage and an index corresponding
to her price series for rural public land. The index is based primarily upon
an estimate of the market value of the public domain managed by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). The value of urban government land in 1956 is deter-
mined as the difference of Goldsmith's 1956 estimate for total federal land,
and her rural land value estimate.
Increments to the rural land stock are determined by the value of the
change in government owned rural acreage, using the rural public land price
series.Increments to the urban land stock are estimated by subtracting the
incremental rural estimate from the change in the annual GSA estimate of the
value of total government land.The yearly stock estimates are computed by—20—
adding these increments to the previous year's stock, after the rural
component for the prior year has been adjusted by a price index for non—
metropolitan land, and the urban component for the prior year has been
adjusted by an urban price index.
Eisner and Pieper [l98i1 estimate the value of federal land in 1980 as
$119.5 billion.They use Milgram's 1968 figure as a base and assume that
annual net investment in land is zero. They infer the change in the market
value of government land from the FED's estimate of the market value of
private land, and from the ratio of Milgram's 1968 estimate to the 1968 FED
estimate for private land. Thus,
OL, M68 GL =FL,FtFL F68
where
GLt is the market value of government land at t.
FL, Ftis the FED's estimate of the market value of private
land in year t.
GL, M68 is Grace Milgram's estimate of the market value of
federal land in 1968.
Table 1tbelowreproduces the estimates of these authors for selected
years.—21—
Table 14: Value of Federal Land in







1911 31.6 E &P
1976 73.3 E &P
1981 128.0 E &P
a) G =Goldsmith
M =Milgram
E & P =Eisnerand Pieper
Eisner and Pieper's estimates for the value of federal land are
consistent with recent work by Raymond Goldsmith on the national balance sheet
(Goldsmith, [1982]). Milgram's study provides estimates of the value of land
over all sectors, 1952—1968. Goldsmith extrapolates these estimates to 1975,
arriving at a figure for the aggregate value, of land of $1551 billion,lie
estimates the share of federal land at 14%, which would give an estimate of $62
billion for the value of federal land in 1975, compared with Eisner and
Pieper's $63.6billion.22-.22—
3.2 New Estimates of the Value of Federal Land
We have extended Grace Milgram's estimates of the value of federal land
to the period 1969—1981.In Table 5, these estimates can be compared with
Eisner's extension of the Goldsmith/Milgram estimates.
Table 5: Value of Federal Land in









1969 37.3 21.915.5 314.9
1970 1ii..3 29.0 15.8 36.14
1971 53.8 36.2i.6 37.6
1972 63.14 .114.3 19.1 Li2.6
1973 72.8 53.1 19.7 50.14
19714 149.9 26.6 57•3
1975 80.14 52.9 27.5 63.6
1976 90.5 57.9 32.6 73.3
1977 105.5 67.6 37.9 82.2
1978 120.3 74.7 145.5 96.9
1979 137.5 86.5 51.0 110.14
1980 1714.14 118.3 56.1 1214.9
1981 175.1 112.14 62.7 128.0—23—
We estimate the value of federal land to be $175 billion in 1981,
composed of $112 billion urban land and $63 billion rural land.Our new
estimates substantially exceed those of Eisner and Pieper.The total is
larger in every year, and the rate of growth is significantly higher.
Ourestimatesare higher because we take into account the change in the
composition of federal land holdings. Eisner and Pieper do not consider the
composition; their extension simply indexes the value of government land by
the change in value of private land in the aggregate. While the total acreage
held by the federal government declined by 3% between 1968 and 1981, its
holdings of more valuable urban acreage doubled.
This total value estimate of $175 billion is approximately the value of
all of the epiipment (such as machines, trucks, typewriters, computers, etc.)
owned by the federal government.23 It is far less than the value of federal
mineral rights as estimated in section 2.
It may be tempting simply to add the value of federal land to mineral
rights. However, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that at least some
of the value of federal mineral rights is capitalized into the value of the
federal land bearing the minerals.In that case, it would be necessary to
discount the value of the land before aggregating the land and the mineral
rights.Since we are uncertain of the extent of capitalization, we have
focused on the disaggregated components rather than their sum.
We have clearly not captured the full value of federal onshore mineral
rights in our land value figures.Our estimate of the value of onshore
mineral rights in 1981, $l16 billion, greatly exceeds the value of federal
rural land, $63 billion.Furthermore, the method of derivation for the—24—
estimates of federal rural land values makes it unlikely that they will
reflect the underlying mineral values.2 Clearly, to obtain the total value
of land and mineral rights, we would have to add some, though not all, of the
value of federal land to our estimate of the value of federal mineral rights.—25—
SU}4MARY AND CONCLUSION
We have presented new and updated estimates of the value of federal
land and oil and gas mineral rights.These estimates are $115 billion and
$819 billion, respectively, by 1981.
Our results reveal the increasing importance of the value of the
federal government's holdings of urban land in the total value of federal land
over the period from 1968 to 1981. Over this interval the federal
government's holdings of urban land doubled in acreage.
We estimate the value of federal oil and gas mineral rights to be very
substantial, particularly following the sharp rise in energy prices in 19114
and 1919.In 1981, for example, the magnitude exceeds the privately held
national debt.
The contributions of this study include attention to the composition of
the holdings of land.It is unique, as far as we know, in its effort to
determine the value of the federal government's mineral rights. We exploit
information about undiscovered reserves and royalty and bonus payments to the
government. Our methodology can be extended both to other minerals and to the
private sector.
There remains room for considerable research on both the value of
government land and its mineral rights. A new benchmark estimate for the
value of federal land in a particular year is especially important. A more
detailed disaggregation of the types of federal land holdings and improved and
updated corresponding price information would also be helpful.
Improved estimates of the size of other mineral resources on federal
land and estimates of the relationship between the quantity of economically—26—
recoverable unproven reserves of oil and gas and their prices would enable us
toproduce more comprehensive measures of wealth.
Finally, let us reemphasize the potential importanceof estimates such
asours to sensible government budgetary decisions.These include land
managementpolicy, general cost—benefit analysis incorporating proper measures
of the opportunity cost of resources, and perhaps even, in some contexts,
fiscal policy.—27—
Appendix on Milgram's Methodology
Milgram's time series estimates for the period 1952—1968 rely
on Raymond Goldsmith's estimate of the value of federal land in
The National Wealth of the United States in the Postwar Period,
p.188.
She uses the following price indexes:
A non—metropolitan price index based upon the value of farm-
land per acre, as estimated by the Department of Agriculture. IR
An urban price index based upon three component indexes:
FHA site prices, and studies of residential land values in
Los Angeles and Philadelphia. 1U1
Average price per acre of rural land held by the government.
This is a weighted average of two indexes: The value of the
public domain in the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (90%), and the value of farmland per acre (10%) PR.
She uses three additional statistics from the Bureau of Land
Management:
An estimate of the value of government land LC1




The statistics of the Bureau of Land Management appear in
Summary Report of Real Property Owned by the United States
throughout the World, General Services Administration.
She computes three series:
Value of Rural Land MR
Value of Urban Land MU.
1
Totalvalue of Government Land MA—28—




•56 + (z56 - 5656
IR





where XX —x n+1 n+1 n
Comments:
(1) Milgram's estimates for 1952—55and1967—68 are extrapolations of the
series determined by the method above.
(2) PR could not be determined for our extension from Milgram's sources.
Our extension from 1969 on uses the published farmland series, but a
series on the value of the public domain was not available from the BLM.
Therefore, the public domain component of the weighted average is based
on an extrapolation of the value of the public domain in 1968.The
growth rate for each subsequent year was assumed to equal the average
annual growth rate of farmland over the period 1969—1981.—29—
Footnotes
This paper is partofa larger project on more comprehensive federal govern-
ment budgets.We want to thank the Center for Economic Policy Research at
Stanford University and the National Bureau of Economic Research for financial
support.
1 The total national debt in 1981 was $1,004 billion.Of this, $210
billion was held by government agencies and the Federal Reserve, leaving
$794 billion held by private individuals and institutions.
2 Those resources estimated to be recoverable and profitable to extract at
current prices and technology.
3 Securities and Exchange Commission [1979), United Nations [1979] and
[19801, Financial Accounting Standards Board [1980), Soladay [19801, and
Landefeld and Hines [1982].
4 They also favor the incorporation of this value in accounting measures of
firmwealth.
5 Securities and Exchange Commission [1979], p. 503, quoted in Landefeld
and Hines, p. 150.
6 If the resource has an increasing cost of extraction, net price should
increase at less than the rate of interest in equilibrium. Landefeld and
Hines neglect to note this in their defense of the net price method.
7 Payments to landowners are only relevant to calculations concerning
firms, and not to calculations of national wealth.
8 Landefeld and Hines, p. 159.
9 Allofthese distortions occur in the accounts of anylandownerif only
proven reserves are taken into consideration.The earlier studies,
discussed in the previous section, were concerned with valuing the assets
and depletion of a producer; they were not concerned as much with the
landowner from whom the lease was obtained. In this paper, of course,
the government is the focus and in the U.S. governments generally are not
producers of minerals.
10The estimates of offshore undiscovered reserves were obtained from the
Federal Offshore Statistics, 1983, U.S. Department of Interior, Mineral
Management Service. The corresponding onshore estimates were obtained by
personal correspondence with Mr. D. Zimmerman of the Department of
Interior. We discuss the methods used by the Department below.—30—
11Calculated using price data from the American Petroleum Institute [19841
and consumer price indices from the Economic Reportofthe President
[19831.
12The royalty rate is assumed to be 12.5% for onshore federal land and
16.67% for offshore reserves in the case of oil and natural gas.It is
calculated using the ratio of minerals produced to royalty payment
received from Mineral Management Service [1984].This source also
permits the calculation of royalty rates for other minerals.If the
federal government is forced to share royalties with the states, the
value of the mineral rights developed later would be divided with them.
13See U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Mineral
Revenues Tables 10 and 13.
14Ibid.
15See Eisner and Pieper [1984].
16See Boskin [19821.
17See Eisner [19801.
18The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) divided the United States onshore and
offshore areas into 137 provinces. Individual appraisals were made for
each of the provinces using geological data and exploration histories as
the basis for separate subjective assessments by six geologists.The
subjective assessments of high, modal, and low probabilities for
undiscovered recoverable resources of oil and gas are averaged, the
aggregated probabilistically across provinces to obtain estimates for the
entire U.S. A more complete description of the methodology used by the
USGS is given in U.S. Geological Survey [1981].
19The procedure for deriving the high and the low figures is as follows.
The mean PRVu figures for gas and oil are multiplied by the ratio of the
corresponding 5th and 95th fractile figures (separating out the offshore
and onshore components) from USGS [19811 and the PYR1OW and
are obtained. Following the methodology for calculation of PVB, PVB1OW
and PVB11 are obtained and the appropriate total values are derived
according to equation 1.
20See USGS [1981] for a survey of other studies.
21U.S. Department of Interior, Federal Offshore Statistics, op. cit.—31--
22Based on his estimate of total national assets in 1980 of $216I5 billion
(Table 89, pg. 200), we can derive his estimate of the value of federal
government land in that year.According to Goldsmith, land values
constituted 13.7% of total national assets.Assuming that the federal
government still holds 1% of total land values, the value of federal
government land in 1980 would be $118.6 billion. This is again roughly
the same magnitude as Eisner and Pieper's corresponding estimate of
$l2I.9 billion and far smaller than our estimate of $174.14 billion.
Goldsmith's estimates suggest that he, like Eisner and Pieper, does not
take into account the substantial change in composition of federal
government land.
23As estimated by Eisner and Pieper [198111.
24The magnitude of the rural land value estimates is largely determined by
the average estimated price of the public domain managed by the BLM.
(See appendix.)The BLM price estimates do not appear to take mineral
rights into account.—32—
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